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INDUSTRIAL MOBILITY AND SURVIVAL OF SENIORITY-
WHAT PRICE SECURITY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
269 
On March 28, 1961, a new star1 appeared in our legal firmament. Like 
the star of earlier and holier origin, this one also, has been gazed upon 
with wonder by certain Wise Men,:! and its portent to some has been a 
cause of rejoicing and to others a cause of "weeping and gnashing of 
teeth.":: Intermixed with the paens of praise may be heard pleas and sup-
plications that the Supreme Court of the United States act soon to restore 
the heavens to their natural order.4 
Zdanok 1.1. Glidden Co.-;, dealt with whether seniority rights under a col-
lective bargaining agreement survive the expiration of t..'le agreement, 
and whether such rights are transferable to another plant in a different 
geographical location when operations cease at the old plant site. 
The decision has brought into sharp focus the conflict between two 
urgent needs of our society, mobility of industry and economic security of 
the worker. There is a ne~essity to develop one or more modi operendi 
by which both needs may be satisfied to the extent that our nation will 
continue to have a dynamic, powerful. industry manned by a relatively 
satisfied, contented working force. 
More than ever before, the constantly accelerating pace of new tech-
nologies, requiring radically different plant facilities and machines, require-
ing new markets6 and new sources of raw materials, and requiring, at the 
same time, control of manufacturing, delivering and selling costs if the 
pace is to be maintained, necessitates that mobility of industry be un-
hindered. The relocation of plants, the expansion of industry into new 
territories, and the contraction of individual company operations ·at one 
location while they expand at new sites, are methods used by industry to 
increase operational efficiency.7 The ability to react swiftly in our present 
fluid economic environment is a sine qtta non to continuing industrial 
strength and development. 
1Zdanokv. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). 
2Aaron, "RePectiom on the Legal Nature ami Enforceability of Seniority Rights/' 75 
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962); "Plant Removal and the Surt'ival of Seniority Rights: The 
Glidden Case," 37 IND. L.J. 380 ( 1962); "Seniority Surt1ival: A New Doctrine of Uncer-
tairJ Prospects." 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 469 ( 1962); Lowden, "Survival of Seniority Rights 
Under Collective Agreements: Zdanok t'. Glidden Co .. " 48 VA. L. REV. 291 ( 1962); 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 1363 ( 1961); Krock, "Jobs as 'Vested Rights' Despite Location Changes," 
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1961, p. 22, Col. 4; Krock, "Use of Judicial Pou·er to Rewrite Labor 
Contracts." N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1961, p. 20, col. 3; "Plant Relocation-Industrial Rela-
tions Implications.'' I.R.C. Industrial Relations Memo #142, May 1962. 
3Matthew 8:12 (J<ing James). 
4E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Amicus Curiae Brief, p. 4. 
SZdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). 
6Industrial Development Department, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, The Story 
of 45 Firms and $180.000,000, 1962. 
1"Piant Relocation-Industrial Relatious Implications," I.R.C. Industrial Relations 
Memo #142, May, 1962, pp. 1-3. 
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Generally opposing this need is the quest by the individual worker for 
economic security, a quest whose urgency has been increased by the very 
fad:ors that demand industrial mobility. "The value which most workers 
attach to security of employment can scarcely be overemphasized."" 
Thousands are left jobless in "backwash areas" all over the country as 
industry moves to new areas of population, to new sources of supply. 
Thousands are unemployed due to replacement of men by machines and 
the replacement of old industries by new ones requiring new and more 
sophisticated skills. Thousands are jobless in the "one crop'' areas of our 
country such as the coal fields of West Virginia, where the "crop" is ex-
hausted, or. can no longer be produced competitively, or is no longer needed 
in as great amounts by industry. 
There exists, then, this on-going conflict of opposing values. This com-
ment will consider two que·stions, using as a vehicle for discussion, Zdanok 
v. Glidden Co.9 The first question is: What method should a decision 
maker use, be he arbitrator, judge or juror, to resolve this conflict of 
values, where the intent of the parties regarding the questions of survival 
of seniority rights and their applicability to a new plant location is unclear 
or non-existent? The second question is: What methods should manage-
ment and the collective bargaining agent of.the employees use to avoid the 
necessity of resolving this conflict in court? 
The security tool involved in the Zdanok case was seniority rights; the 
issues were the survival of such rights following the termination of the 
collective bargaining agreement and their applicability to a new plant site 
upon the cessation of operations at the old plant location. This comment 
will discuss the nature of seniority rights; the facts of the subject case 
and its judicial history; the validity of the technical reasoning that provided 
the basis for the decision; the nature of the impact that the decision may 
have on mobility of industry and security of the worker; and finally, 
various types of provisions· that could be utilized by parties to collective 
bargaining agreements to satisfactorily deal with the problem. 
JI. THE NATURE OF SENIORITY RJ:GHTS10 
Seniority is the principle by which length of employment determines 
the order of layoffs, re-hirings and advancements. Preference is given 
according to length of employment.11 Seniority rights are not inherent in 
SREYNOLDS, The Stmcture of Labor Markets (New York; Harber & Brothers, 19.51), 
p. 86. 
9 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). 
to An excellent and detailed discussion of this subject may be found in Aaron, "Re· 
/luctions on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights," 7.5 HARV. L. REv. 
1.532 (1962). 
11Jnternational B'd of Locomotive Engr's v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971 (1934). 
See ,f!enerally, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 908-11, Collective 
Bargaining Pr011isions: Seniority (1949). 
1963] COMMENTS 271 
the employment relationship, but must stem either from statute or from 
a contract between employer and employee, or from a collective bargaining 
agreement.12 The almost universal rule has been that upon termination of 
the instrument creating seniority rights, the rights are at an end (in absense 
of express agreement to the contrary) .13 Cases have held that collective 
bargaining agreements between the empl0yees' bargaining agent and the 
employer are not designed to place in the hands of the parties the power 
to change or modify the contract at pleasure, so as to affect injuriously 
the individual rights of the employees theretofore secured by the agrec-
ment;14 but the decisions generally hold that seniority rights accruing to 
an individual employee under a collective bargaining agreement may be 
modified by subsequent agreement which is to the general interest of all 
members, although an individual member is harmfully affected thereby.1;; 
Seniority questions, including discharges and layoffs alleged to be in 
violation of seniority rights, have been held arbitrable under a broad arbi-
tration clause such as one providing for arbitration of "any grievance or 
dispute arising out of the application of any of terms" of the agreement/11 
but not under a narrow arbitration clause referring to arbitration of griev-
ances and disputes regarding wages and working conditions and not 
mentioning disputes as to the interpretation or construction of the con-
tract.1; Seniority provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement 
are enforceable by an individual employee on the theory that the provi-
sions are inserted for his benefit.18 Seniority provisions should be construed 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, nature of the operations 
t:Local Lodge 2040, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Serve!, 268 F.2d 692 (7th 
Cir. 1959), ccrt. den., 361 U.S. 884 (1960); Elder v. New York Cent. R. Co., 152 F.2d 
361 (6th Cir. 1945); S}•stem Federation No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. La. & A. Ry. Co., 
119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941); Local 201, Intern. Union of Elec. Radio and Mach. Work-
ers, AFL-ClO v. General Elec. Co., 163 F. Supp. 741 (D.C. Mass.), aff'd. 262 F.2d 265 
(1959). 
t~Elder v. New York Cent. R. Co., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); System Federation 
No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. La. & A. Ry. Co., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941). 
HElder v. New York Cent. R. Co., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); Piercy v. louisville 
& N.R. Co., 198 Ky. 477,248 S.W. 1042,33 A.L.R. 322 (1923). 
I GElder v. New York Cent. R. Co., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); System Federation 
No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. La. & A. Ry. Co., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941); Britt v. Trail-
mobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950); Division 525, Order of Railway Conductors 
of America v. Gorman, 133 F.2d 273 (1943); Hartley v. Brotherhood of R.&S.S. Clerks, 
283 Mich. 201,277 N.W. 885 (1938). 
l•·Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal. App. 2d 667, 220P.2d 973 (1950). 
17Tcxoma N.uural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, 58 F. Supp. 132 
(1943). aff'cl 146 F.2d 62 (19·14), ccrt. den. 324 U.S. 872 (1944); Sinclair Prairie Oil 
Co. v. Dose, 189 Okla. 569, 118 P.2d 210 (1941); Re local Union 1357, I.B.E.W., 40 
Hawaii 183 (1953). But note the federal law now enunuciated by the United States Su· 
prcme Court, that grievance and arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement 
embraces all of the questions on which the parties disagree except matters which the parties 
specifically exclude. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); United Steelworker~ v. Warrior & Gulf N.w. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Cn., 363 U.S. 56-1 (1960). 
II• Rentschler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 126 Neb. 443, 253 N.W. 694 (1934); Baron v. 
Kurn, 349 Mo. 1202, 164 S.W. 2•1 310 ( 1942). 
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contemplated and regulated thereby, and the objects sought to be ac-
complished.19 
III. FACTS OF THE CASE AND ITS JUDICIAL HISTORY 
The Elmhurst, Long Island, New York plant of Glidden Company's 
Durkee Famous Foods Division was in. operation from 1929 to November 
30, 1957. Vegetable oils were refined and coconut, spices and condiments 
~ere processed and packaged. The hourly paid employees of the plant had 
been, since December 1, 1949, represented by General Warehousemen's 
Union, Local 852, affiliated with the Teamster's Union. The employees 
had been covered by three successive two-year collective bargaining agree-
ments, the last running from December 1, 1955, to November 30, 1957. 
Each of the contracts contained the same seniority provisions.20 The con-
tract also contained provisions providi~g for pensions, hospital, medical 
and surgical insurance, life insurance and accidental death insurance. 
In 1953, the Glidden management undertook a program to review all 
of its operations in detail, with a view to improving operations and profits 
in all.divisions. These reviews revealed that the Elmhurst plant was a 
comparatively marginal operation and that the· equipment was not only 
old, but outdated. Refinements in techniques of coconut and condiment 
processing required more modern machinery.::1 Due to the Elmhurst plant's 
geographical location, Glidden was forced to pay certain freight penalties 
for shipment of oils to and from the vegetable oil refinery there. The plant 
contained four fl~ors and a basement, and the expense required to modern-
ize the plant and arrange production lines to form a more efficient opera-
tion was prohibitive. Glidden decided on a two stage plan. The first stage 
was to move the vegetable oil refining operations from the Elmhurst plant 
to Glidden's vegetable oil refinery in Louisville, Kentucky. This was ac-
complished in October, 1956. In May, 1957, the second stage was set in 
motion when Glidden leased a building at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, for 
the spices, coconut, and condiment processing operations. Through the 
use of new and improved machinery, better production line layouts, and 
more modern production methods, operational efficiency would be greatly 
improved. 
On May 16, 1957, Glidden notified employees at Elmhurst, by letter and 
by personal discussion, that the company had decided to discontinue the 
19Earle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 25 Tenn. App. 660, 167 S.W. 2d 15 (1942); ccrl. den. 
317 u.s. 680 (1942). 
20"In instances of continuous layoff, seniority shall be terminated after: 
1. An employee with less than five (5) years' continuous employment at the time his 
layoff began is on continuous layoff of two (2) years; or 
2. An employee with more than five ( 5) years' continuous employment at the time 
his layoff began is on continuous layoff of three ( 3) years. 
Employees whose seniority is terminated due to continuous layoff shall receive first 
preference for employment before new employees are hired." 
Statement of facts prepared by the Glidden Company, May 25, 1961, p. 5. 
21/d. at 2. 
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remaining operations at Elmhurst, and to start up operations in the ne,.,-
Bethlehe:m plant.!!!! The company did not expect to commence operations 
in the new plant until late fall of 1957, so the employees were being noti-
fied at least six months in advance. Glidden offered to give fair considera-
tion to applications of Elmhurst employees for employment at Bethlehem, 
but only if they would come to Bethlehem and make application on the 
same basis as other persons who might seek employment there. 
On September 16, 1957, the company gave written notice to the union 
at its Elmhurst plant that it would terminate the collective bargaining 
agreement on November 30, 1957, the expiration date of the agreement. 
The agreement provided for automatic renewal unless either party gave 
60 days' notice of termination. 
On October 23, 1957, the union filed and served on the company a 
notice to arbitrate six issues in connection with closing the Elmhurst plant. 
Two of the issues of relevance here were: ( 1) whether closing the Elm-
hurst plant without offering each employee continued employment with 
full seniority was a breach of the contract; (2) whether the closing was 
accomplished to evade the agreement and prevent collective barg:lining 
in violation of the law. 
Glidden made a motion in the Supreme Court of New York to stay 
arbitration on the ground that the disputes were not arbitrable under the 
arbitration provision of the agreement.:!3 The arbitration clause provided: 
Any question, grievance or dispute arising out of and involving the inter-
pretation and application of the specific terms of .this Agreement ... shall, 
at the request of either party, be referred to the New York Mediation 
Board for arbitration. 24 
The court granted the company's motion, on the ground that the subjects 
sought to be arbitrated were not covered by specific terms of the contract.2 :; 
The opinion laid much emphasis on the word "specific" in the agreement 
to arbitrate, and said that "No one is under a duty to resort to arbitration 
unless by clear language he has so agreed."26 The court concluded its 
opinion with the ruling that "Glidden's motion to stay arbitration must be 
granted, whatever other remedies the Union may have with respect to the 
alleged disputes."27 
22/d. at 2. . 
23General Warehousemen's Union v. Glidden Co., 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172 N.Y.S. 2<1 G7H 
(Sup. Ct. 1958). 
2i/d. at 703, 172 N.Y.S. 2d at 681. 
25/d. at 704-05, 172 N.Y.S. 2d at 682. 
26Notice that the New York court placed the burden on the moving party to point out 
the specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement which would bring the dispur<:cl 
issues within the arbitration clause. Since then, the "arbitration trilogy'' supra, note ltl, ha~ 
placed the burden on the opposing party to point out the provision that would sp<:cifically 
exclude the disputed issue. Had this been the state of the law at the time the cas<: (am<: 
before the New York court, the issues would probably have become matters for arhitrarir,n. 
27General Warehousemen's Union v. Glidden Co., 10 Misc. 2d 700, 706, 172 N.YS 
2d 678,684 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
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Following the decision in the arbitration case, Olga Zdanok and four 
other former employees at the Elmhurst plant brought an action for dam-
ages for breach of the collective bargaining agreement in the Supreme 
Court of New York. At the company's request, the case was moved to the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship.28 The plaintiffs contended that they 
were beneficiaries of the contract between their union and the defendant 
company, and were entitled to jobs which were created by the opening of 
the plant at Bethlehem. They stated that they were laid off because of re-
moval of machinery and cessation of operations at Elmhurst, and that 
since work was available at Bethlehem, they were entitled by reason of 
seniority and the contract provisions relating to it, to continue their work 
at Bethlehem with the seniority acquired at Elmhurst.20 
The court ruled in favor of the company, pointing out that the critical 
issue was not whether u.1.e employee's seniority rights survived the termi-
nation of the contract per se, but rather, whether the contract spelling out 
their rights extended beyond the Elmhurst plant. 
It is not enough for plaintiffs to establish that if the Elmhurst opera-
tions had continued, their seniority status would have survived the termi-
nation of the collective bargaining agreement. In order to recover, plain-
tiffs must also show that the governing seniority system gave them the 
right to "follow their work" to the new plant.30 ... I find nothing in the 
record to warrant the conclusion urged by the plaintiffs as to the unlimited 
geographic scope of theiJ: seniority rights.31 
The agreement between Glidden and local 852, the court continued, 
refers ·to plant and department seniority, but says nothing about seniority 
in case of plant abandonment, transfer, merger or consolidation of opera-
tions. "It would be unreasonable," the court explained, "to expect a court 
to imply a general understanding between the parties as to the extent of 
the seniority unit when no evidence has been offered as to negotiations 
on the subject, or an established course of practice on the part of the em-
ployer."32 The court then stated: 
This is not the case of an employer who has abandoned the specified plant 
and transferred operations to a new location in order to circumvent con-
tractual or statutory requirements. Where, as here, the Board of Directors' 
decision to relocate is based on the exercise of business judgment in good 
faith, the etpployer's obligation to deal fairly and honestly with its em· 
ployees is satisfied. In sum, under the circumstances presented in this case, 
where no relevant limitation on the employer's freedom of action is found 
in the agreement or the prior conduct of the parties, no policy of New 
2sZdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
29]d. at 444. 
aou. at 447. 
a1]d. at 448. 
a2]d. at 448. 
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York law or our national labor law requires the employer to preserve for 
its employees seniority status acquired under an expired agreement cov-
vering a closed plant.aa 
275 
The District Court in its decision appears to be enunciating the general 
rule that provisions for seniority rights in collective bargaining agreements 
should be interpreted by the courts in accord with well established canons 
of contract construction, and that the terms of the agreement, the sur-
rounding circumstances and the prior conduct of the parties are all to be 
considered in determining the nature of the· seniority rights embodied in 
the agreement.34 The court in its consideration of those factors demon-
strated quite convincingly that the parties intended neither that the senior-
ity rights should survive the termination of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, nor that such rights should be transferred to a new plant site. On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 
the District Court's judgment in a 2 to 1 decision,35 holding on the pro-
cedural issues that a state court's decision refusing to compel arbirtation 
was not res judicata of the plaintiffs' case and that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to enforce their seniority rights under a collective bargaining 
agreement. On the merits of the case, the court held that ". . . plaintiffs 
were entitled to be employed in the defendant's Bethlehem plant, with 
seniority and re-employment rights which they had acquired at the Elm-
hurst plant. The refusal of the defendant to recognize that entitlement was 
a breach of contract, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the damages 
which that breach has caused them.''36 · 
The United States Supreme Court granted .certiorari only on the ques-
tion whether participation by a Court of Claims judge vitiated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that judges of 
the Court of Claims could validly serve on United States District Courts 
and Courts of Appeals.37 
IV. ANALYSIS OF COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
"Come now, and let us reason together" 
Isaiah 1:18 
The Court of Appeals in reversing the District Court answered in the 
affirmative, two questions: ( 1) whether the plaintiffs had any seniority 
rights after November 30, 1957, when the contract expired, and (2) 
whether such rights were ·applicable at another plant. 
In answering the first question in the affirmative, the court held that 
seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement which provides 
33Id. at 449. 
34Earle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 25 Tenn. App. 660, 167 S.W. 2d 15 (1942), cert. den. 
3I7 U.S. 680, 87 L.ed. 546, 63 S.Ct. 161 (1942). 
35Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). 
3GJd. at 104. 
37Glidden Co. v. Zdanok et al., 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
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for priority of recall on the basis of seniority in the event of a layoff, but 
which fails to provide for disposition of these rights upon termination of 
the agreement, are "vested" rights which survive the expiration of the 
agrcement,38 a sharp departure from previous holdings.=111 The court in 
arriving at this decision drew an analogy to the retirement benefits pro-
vided by the agreement, and considered the seniority rights to have been 
"earned" unemployment insurance/0 that could not be unilaterally an-
nulled by the employer. The court apparently reasoned that since the 
terms of the agreement provided for seniority rights for three years and 
the contract was merely for a term of two years, the parties contemplated 
survival of the seniority rights (this is not stated expressly in the opinion) . 
But how the court could consider such rights as "vested" and at the same 
time assert that the employee's authorized union agent " ... could bar-
gain away the employee's right"41 without the individual employee's ap-
proval, is a question left unanswered. As one writer has aptly put it: 
... it [the Court] has held seniority to be "vested" and at the same time 
ter~ed it "contingent" upon the union's bargaining to keep it in effect, 
thereby really admitting that the quoted seniority provisions were written, 
not to extend the contract term, but in the "expectation" that the contract 
would be renewed.42 
The analogy drawn between pension plans and seniority rights pre-
supposes two propositions: ( 1) that a pension plan automatically gives 
the employee a vested right from the inception of the plan, and ( 2) that 
there is substantial similarity between pension plans and seniority rights. 
Both propositions are fallacious. The courts have generally held that un-
less the pension plan provides for complete or partial vesting of hendits 
in accordance with a fixed time schedule, the employee must work until 
he reaches the mandatory retirement age,43 and the plan must continue 
in operation until that time,44 before the employee can be said to have a 
vested right under the pension plan. 
38Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1961). 
39Local Lodge 2040, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Servcl, 268 F.2J 692 (7th 
Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 884 (1960); Elder v. New York Cent, R. Co., 152 F.2J 
361 (6th Cir. 1945); System Federation No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. La. & A. Ry. Co., 119 
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941). 
40The term "unemployment insurance" was applied to seniority rights by the court in 
Grand International BrorherhooJ of Locomotive f:n~-:incers v. Mills, tl3 Ariz. 379, :H P.2J 
971 (1934). 
41Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F. 2d 99, 103 (2nd Cir. 1961 ). 
4:?Lowden, "Sr1rl'iz•al of Se11inrii'Y Rir:hu Under Colluli!'c A.~r<'t:lllt:IIII: :/.d111wk v. 
Glidden Co.",4S VA. L. REV. 291,296 (1962). 
4
=
1Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 20H ( lldcs, 1 1)5H). 
44"Collective-bargaining agrel·mcnts run for a spccili~ rim(: - I year, 2 }'cars, etc ... 
If the agreement is not exrendeJ or rencwc<l. the plan may he tli\llllltinul·tl. It may he said, 
therefore, that the economic security J•rll\'itlc,l the c111plo}'Cl' n·sr~. to }:real l'XIl·nt, on the 
forrunes of collective bar,t:aining." Smat:: bbnr Committcl•'s Subcommittee on Wclf:m· nnd 
Pension Funds, S. Rep. No. 17Yi, 8-1th Cong., 2<1 S<:ss.tiO ( liJ%). 
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Similarity between pension plans and seniority rights is completely laCk-
ing. Once the employee does have a vested right under the pension plan, 
and is allowed by his employer to continue to work, subsequent collective 
bargaining agreements cannot divest him of his right unless he so agrees.45 
However, seniority rights may be modified by subsequent agreement of 
the employer and the employee's collective bargaining agent.46 The vested 
right under a pension plan represents an amount of money that can be 
calculated exactly, and is treated as property which may be lawfully 
claimed by the heirs or designated beneficiaries of the employee who 
acquire the right.47 Seniority rights, however, cannot be easily valued in 
terms of dollars; the employee has no power of disposition, except the 
power of relinquishing the rights, and the rights exist only where there 
is continuing or potentially continuing employment.48 
The label, "unemployment insurance," applied by the court to the plain-
tiffs' seniority rights is totally inaccurate. Insurance represents the concept 
of cash indemnity rather than continuing employment, which is what the 
plaintiffs are seeking.49 Seniority rights do not guarantee the employee 
against unemployment but merely give him preference for jobs where 
jobs exist.1;o Under a contract of insurance, the right to indemnification is 
against the insurer. Seniority rights, however, are rights to job preference 
and are exercised against one's fellow employees. In fact, if the employee 
is under a system of seniority, then regardless of his ability to fill a certain 
job, if that is the only job available and if there are employees senior to 
him, he will be ttnemployed. The term, "unemployment insurance," would 
therefore appear to mislead rather than aid one who seeks to analyze the 
court's reasoning. 
Having found that the seniority rights survived the· termination of the 
agreement, the Court had little difficulty in finding that a condition should 
be implied in the agreement that such rights would be applicable at the 
new plant site. The court concluded that the language of the preamble 
in the agreement which states that the agreement was made "for and on 
behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona A venue and 94th Street, 
•r.vallejo v. American R.R. of P.R., 188 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1951); Allen v. City of 
long Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 287 P.2d 765 (1955). 
46Elder v. New York Cent. R. Co., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); System Federation 
No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. La. & A. Ry. Co., 119 F. 2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941); Britt v. 
Trailmobile Co., 179 F. 2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950); Division 525, Order of Railway Conduc-
tors of America v. Gorman, 133 F. ~d 273 (1943); Hartley v. Brotherhood of R. & S.S. 
Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938). 
-47Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935). 
4 SI.ocal Lodge 2040, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Serve!, 268 F. 2d 692, 697 
(7th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 884 (1960). · 
-49"Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, 
damage, or liability, arising from an unknown or contingent event." CAL. INS. CODE, § 22. 
sou.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 908-911, Collective Bar-
gaining Provisions: Seniority, p. 1 (1949). 
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Elmhurst, Long Island, New York,'':;1 was not meant to fix the geographi-
cal scope of the agreement. 
A rational construction of the contract would seem to require that the 
statement of location was nothing more than a reference to the then 
existing situation, and had none of the vital significance which the de-
fendant would attach to it. 
The court found it "hard to conjure up a reason why":;:! a change in geo-
graphical location should destroy contract rights. The company would be 
put to "no expense or embarrassment," and the court in so holding was 
"adopting the more rational, not to say humane, construction" of the 
agreement. 53 
So much for the court's reasoning. What may be presumed from the 
action of the Court of Appeals when, instead of affirming a well-reasoned 
opinion by the District Court, it reversed that decision on the basis of 
clearly inaccurate analogies and conclusionary labels? To answer this ques-
tion, one should first make a careful distinction between the reasoning 
process used by a court in determining whether, by implication, it can 
find the intent of the parties regarding a certain issue, and the philosophy 
of the court as to its role in the judicial process, if such intent cannot be 
found. The District Court in the Zdmwk case clearly adhered to the phi-
losophy that courts should refrain from re-writing agreements and that 
the parties should be left in the position in which they placed them-
selvcs.54 The opposing philosophy is that society depends on the courts to 
resolve disputes that the parties have been unable to resolve themselves, 
and that the basic, underlying question is not whether the intent of the 
parties has been manifested in some agreement, but rather, what arc the 
rights and duties of the parties based on the court's concepcion of what 
will best effectuate the desires and needs of society. Under this philosophy, 
if the intent of the parties is unclear or non-existent, the job of the court 
is to determine the rights and duties of the parties based upon the best 
interests of the community. 
No defense is here made for either philosophy. Both arc answers to 
the same question: What is the role of the judiciary in our society? How-
ever, it must be pointed out that the discussion in this comment con-
cerning the resolution of conflicting values where the intent of the parties 
has not been evidenced, necessarily presupposes that some courts have in 
the past adopted the latter philosophy, and that they can be expected to 
continue to adhere to that philosophy in the future. Under the "non-
imcrvention" philosophy followed by the District Court, a discussion of 
:·•Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F. 2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1961). 
r.:Jd. at I 04. 
r. 3Jd. at 104. 
:·•ZJanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441,449 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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the conflicting social values of industrial mobility and job security for the 
worker is an "exercise in futility," since the court will nt:ver arrive at the 
point where the conflict must be considered. Either the intent is evident, 
expressly or impliedly, or it is not. In either situation the case is over at 
that point. 
It is where the court has adopted the broader philosophy that this dis-
cussion of conflicting values becomes operative, and it is here that the 
court must use care to maintain the distinction between: ( 1) the reason-
ing process used to determine the intent of the parties; and ( 2) the role 
of the court when no intent is found. Where that distinction is blurred. 
where the court talks in terms of implied intent but in reality is deciding 
on grounds of social desirability, confusion reigns in the minds of those 
who look to such a decision for guidance. Such was the Zdanok decision. 
Why did the Court of Appeals overrule the District Court? The Court 
of Appeals, although actually finding nothing from the terms of the 
agreement or the conduct of the parties to imply an intention that the 
seniority rights survived, nevertheless felt impelled tO act to relieve the 
plight of the plaintiffs, who would undoubtedly find it difficult to get 
work at the same rate of pay and job security that they had enjoyed with 
Glidden Company. The court's reasoning was nothing more than a facade 
behind which the court reacted to the need for security evidenced by the 
plaintiffs.m; The court, however, did a twofold disservice to those who 
must engage in the collective bargaining process. 
First, by labeling seniority rights as "vested" prior to the termination 
of the collective bargaining agreement where such intent is not evident, 
the court has set in motion the usual "solidifying process," wherein some 
courts adopt a term without regard to the context in which it was origi-
nally developed.1i6 Thus is born the "blackletter" law which enlightened 
55Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F. 2d 99, 104 (2nd Cir. 1961). The Court states that it 
is "adopting the more rational, not to say humane, construction" of the agreement, and 
states that a construction of the agreement which would disappoint the reasonable expecta-
tions of the plaintiff employees "would be irrational and destructive." 
~Gin Oddie v."Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961), the court 
accorded the plaintiffs' seniority rights a status independent of the agreement, holdiog in 
accord with Zdanok (the only case cited), that the rights were transferable to a new plant 
location. The court did not quote nor interpret the seniority provisions in the collective bar-
gaining agreement before it. However, in Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Company, 305 F.2d 143 
(6th Cir. 1962), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. The Court 
compared the "recognition clauses" in the Ross Gear and the Glidden agreements and held 
that the language in the Ross Gear agreement was plain and unambiguious and limited the 
application of the provisions to "the City limits of Detroit.". Therefore, the Court found no 
merit in the argument that plaintiffs seniority rights were "vested" rights which could not 
be cut off by the relocation of the plant to Tennessee. The Court went to some pains to 
criticize the use of the word "vested" in the Glidden decision, and said: 
"Accordingly, we do not have the question of whether plaintiffs' 'vested' rights can be validly 
terminated by relocation of the plant in Tennessee. Rather, it is the question of what rights 
if any, the plaintiffs have under express provisions of the bargaining agreement upon the 
relocation of the planr in Tennessee. If no rights were acquired under the bargaining agree-
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courts must either avoid by legal gymnastics or directly oppose, if a proper 
decision is to be rendered. A candid opinion, stating the real factors that 
motivated the court, would have been of much greater worth to the collec-
tive bargaining process and to the legal profession. 
Second, in considering the plaintiffs' need for security, the court ex-
amined only one of the conflicting values discussed earlier . .;; A proper 
resolution of this conflict demanded consideration of the other value, mo-
bility of industry. Some factors necessary to consider were ( 1) the num-
ber of other employees at Elmhurst that could reasonably be expected to 
exercise their vested seniority rights; (2) the commitments, moral or legal, 
that Glidden had made with the Bethlehem community regarding the hir-
ing of local citizens; and ( 3) the financial assistance programs, perhaps 
requiring local hiring as a prerequisite, being offered to industry by Penn-
sylvania or the Bethlehem community.58 
The conclusion drawn froin the foregoing analysis is that the reason-
ing supporting the decision in the Zdanok case is clearly wrong. Further-
more, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the court chose 
the proper value in deciding the case. The conflict of values can always 
be resolved by arbitrarily choosing one or the other, but if the dual ob-
jectives of a dynamic industry and a satisfied working force are to be 
attained, the factors supporting each value must be fully considered. 
V. IMPACT OF THE DECISION 
Consideration of an interesting study, "Plant Relocation and Job Se-
curity: A Case Study,"59 will provide assistance in judging the impact that 
the Zdanok case will have on mobility of industry and economic security 
of the worker. This study considered the effect of various personal and 
social variables on the decision made by a group of workers when they 
ment as employees at the Tennessee plant, it necessarily follows that no rights have been 
cut off." 
The Court of Appeals' ·decision, if not directly contra the Glidden decision, at least 
clearly rejects the survival doctrine enunciated by the Glidden case. 
570ne might wonder why defendant Glidden Company did not make a stronger argu· 
ment supporting unhindered mobility. Generally, management defends on the basis of tradi-
tional contract doctrine, with little emphasis on factors that support the social policy favoring 
its case. Whether management does so because it takes the court at its word, i.e., that the 
court will decide interpretation cases through the application of traditional principles of con· 
tract construction, or because management seeks to halt the steady encroachment of the 
. collective bargaining agent on "management perogatives," is not clear. If the latter is the 
reason, then management should profit from the experience of the French with their Maginot 
line - a static defense ultimately results in defeat. If the former is the reason then the 
Zdanok case and the District Court's decision in the Oddie case surely should have convinced 
management that in the future it would be well advised to emphasize not only technical 
contract doctrine, but also the social value of mobility of industry. 
5&See "Hotter Bidding for New Plants," Business Week December 16, 1961, p. 127. The 
article points out that 33 states now offer a variety of financial aids to attract new industry. 
Financial assistance may be in the form of tax exemptions, loans at a reduced rate of interest, 
donations of land and/ or buildings, and cash. 
59Gordon and HcCorry, "Plant Relocation & ]ob Secttrit}': A Case Study", 11 IND. & 
LAB. REL. REVIEW 13 (1957-58). 
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were faced with the choice of following jobs to another locality or risk-
ing the uncertainties of finding a new job in the local labor market area. 
1he case study was conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area in ea" -~ 
1954. A large automobile corporation decided to discontinue car produc-
tion in its Bay Area plant. A special agreement was negotiated with the 
union, in which the production workers were offered an opportunity to 
transfer to the corporation's los Angeles plant 45 0 miles distant, with re-
tention of seniority .rights.60 The plant employed 1450 workers at this 
time. According to the authors of the study, both management and union 
apparently expected that the group choosing transfer would be composed 
predominately of workers possessing relatively high seniority. 61 However, 
such was not the case. 
The June, 1954, agreement contained the following provisions: 
( 1) Each employee electing to transfer retained his seniority and was 
to continue work in the los Angeles department or division which 
corresponded most closely to the department in which he had 
worked in the Bay Area. 
( 2) The employees would be called to work in los Angeles in accord 
with seniority order on the los Angeles lists (after integration of 
seniority lists of los Angeles employees and Bay Area transfers), 
subject to ability to do the available work. 
( 3) The employees who elected to transfer would get the same wages 
if assigned to the same job.62 • 
The agreement made no provision for payment of travel or moving ex-
pense. If the employees became unemployed in Los Angeles, wages and 
employment conditions would be about the same as in San Francisco. 
Although approximately one third of the employees decided to transfer 
in June, .five to seven months before hiring began in los Angeles, only 
three hundred and .fifteen actually transferred. Probably those who changed 
their minds found jobs in the interim. 
The study showed that the men who were most apprehensive about 
their chances of .finding other suitable jobs in the Bay Area were most 
likely to elect to transfer. These were the older men (age group 45 and 
up), Negroes, and men with relatively low rates of pay. Seniority stand-
ing appeared to have relatively little influence on transfer choices.63 
The effect of the Z~anok case is to give the plaintiffs basically the same 
rights as received by the employees in the case study. The plaintiffs' 
sou. at 14. 
Glld. at 14. 
G2Id. at 15-16. 
G3Id. at 34-35. The important aspect of seniority to men in these classifications was jfJh 
preference over those who would have no seniority rights whatever with the company. 
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seniority rights at Bethlehem would also be subject to the availability of 
jobs that tlie plaintiffs could perform. Assuming that the rights under 
the transfer agreement in the case study and the rights granted by the 
Zdanok decision are basically the same, the results of the case study should 
be helpful to management and the collective bargaining agent. When-
ever a plant relocation is contemplated, the study should prove helpful 
in estimating the number of transferees to the new plant site. The case 
study indicates several factors to be considered: ( 1) the number of em-
ployees classified as probable· transferees; ( 2) the comparative economic 
situation at the old and the new plant sites; ( 3) the comparative cultural 
environment and the way of life at the old and the new plant sites; ( 4) 
the period of advance notice to be given to the employees; and ( 5) the 
effort expended by both management.and the collective bargaining agent 
in assisting employees in finding employment elsewhere. What terms each 
of the panies to a collective bargaining agreement will desire may well 
depend upon the results of the consideration of these factors. 
VJ. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM 
A wide range of approaches are available for handling the seniority 
problem if plant relocation is contemplated.04 The following suggested 
agreements could be utilized by parties to collective bargaining agreements 
to satisfactorily deal with the problem. 
1. The parties may agree on provisions recognizing the transferability 
of seniority to the new plant site without any limitations. 
2. The parties may agree on provisions expressly stating thilt there will 
be no transferability of seniority and no hiring preference given to former 
employees at the new plant site. 
3. The parties may agree on provisions which allow preferential hiring 
with limited seniority. Under the terms of the American Can and Inter-
national Association of Machinists contract, an employee who is being 
terminated as the result of a plant closing and who is eligible for sever-
ance pay or allowance, may instead elect to receive preferential hiring at 
.another plant, if there are jobs available there.05 A transferred employee 
carries his credit for length of service to the second plant but he is placed 
-at the bottom· of the seniority roster for purposes of layoff and promotion. 
4. The parties may agree on provisions which permit negotiation on 
transfer eligibility when work is removed to a new plant. The agreement 
between lockheed Aircraft (California Division) and the Machinists pro-
vides that if work is transmitted from one plant to another, the company 
64An excellent coverage of personnel planning for relocation may be found in "Planl 
Relocation - Induslrial Relations Implications", I.R.C. Industrial Relations Memo #142 
pp. 24-43, May, 1962. 
65Jd. at 41. 
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and union will negotiate the matter of which employees shall transfer to 
such plant.66 The employee's rights and benefits continue, except as re-
stricted by a subsequent contract negotiated with the bargaining agent 
representing the employees at the new plant. 
5. The parties may agree on provisions that do not provide for the 
problem of plant relocation, waiting until relocation occurs before arriv-
ing at an agreement on the matter. For example, at Mack Trucks, Inc., 
problems relating to plant relocation have been handled through a sepa-
rate agreement with Local 343 of the United Auto Workers.67 The agree-
ment was designed to provide for the moving of a plant from Plainfield, 
New Jersey to Hagerstown, Maryland, shortly after the termination of 
the regular contract. Some employees in the Local challenged the reloca-
tion agreement in the federal court. The agre~ment was held to be a full 
discharge of any contractual obligations owed by the employer to the 
employees at the old plant. The employees transferring were permitted 
to carry over their seniority credits to the extent that these related to lay-
off and recall, and to the usual employee benefits. 
6. Finally, the parties may agree on provisions permitting monetary 
settlements for liquidation of seniority rights, using some system of years 
and months as a basis for measurements of the amount of the s~ttlement.68 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Our nation is at the threshold of what may be termed the Technologi-
cal Renaissance. The accomplishments of science and industry during the 
next few decades, even the next few years, may exceed the most optimistic 
expectations. Yet, industrial power has value in our society only if men, 
and not machines, are the masters. The well being of the individual pro-
vides the rationale for these intensive efforts to increase and improve in-
dustrial production. The worker's quest for security is as urgent a need, 
as important a social value, as the mobility of industry. Each is a sine qua 
non of continuing progress in our society, and although the values appear 
to conflict, they are also complementary. Mobility results in the expansion 
of industry and, therefore, the creation of more jobs. Job security results 
in a more productive labor force. 
However1 the individual worker who at the moment is faced with loss 
of his job, or the individual company which is faced with difficulties caused 
tsJd. at 42. 
07Jd. at.42. 
OBin Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, 203 F. Supp 636 (1962), the 
Court held that the union, in negotiating a severance pay clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement, had effectively negotiated away rights wbich might have belonged to the employees 
had such clause not been present. In Giardana v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 905 
(1962), the Court held that a separation agreement negotiated by the employer and the 
collective bargaining agent left only such rights as were established by the separation agree-
ment itself. 
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by having to "carry" employees to the new plant location, cannot be ex-
pected to consider the overall situation and here the values conflict. The 
Zdanok case dealt·with this conflict but failed to consider the factors sup-
porting each of the values. Perhaps the fault partly lies in the attempt by 
the courts to apply a body of traditional contract principles to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, rather than developing a body of labor law 
responsive to the inherently different nature of the collective bargaining 
process.69 Applying contract principles developed in the pastoral setting 
of medieval England and early America, rather than viewing the collec-
tive bargaining process in the setting of a complex society built upon a 
dynamic technology, can only result in a failure of the courts to properly 
resolve the conflicts before tliem. Struggling to maintain verbal symmetry 
with a body of law that may not be applicable to begin with only com-
pounds the fault, and forces future decision makers to waste time and 
energy in arriving at the true issues. 
As to the company, the question the court should ask is: What price 
mobility? As to the employees, the question that the court should consider 
in relation to the factors mentioned in this comment; the question that 
the court should state clearly to all who will later read the opinion is: 
ll7 hat price secttrity? 
WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR. 
G9An interP~ting discussion on this question ml!y be found in Chamberlain, "Col/eclivo 
Bargaining and Jhe Concept of Conlracl", 48 CoLUM. L. RBv. 829 ( 1948). 
